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Abstract: Owing to generalised participation in Petrocaribe and 
increasingly also the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA), the destinies of certain Caribbean states have rarely 
been so intertwined. Yet, with Venezuela – the undeniable lynchpin of 
these schemes – shaken by violent unrest, there is a real threat to 
continuation of the generous funding that it provides. Indeed, 
because ALBA and Petrocaribe funding is channelled largely through 
parallel governance structures centred on the state oil company 
PDVSA, this threat is even more significant than many realise, albeit 
not as imminent as suggested by foreign media. With few alternative 
donors or investors lining up to replace the support offered by 
Venezuela, Caribbean recipients of Venezuela’s special and 
differential treatment must think carefully of about how to respond 
to the current crisis. 
 
Keywords: Venenzuela, Protests, Governance, Petrocaribe, ALBA, 
Caribbean Relations 
 
VENEZUELA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE CHÁVEZ ERA 
 
As those of a certain age will realise, there is nothing new about 
Venezuelan involvement in the wider politics of the Caribbean.1 As 
far back as the 1970s Trinidadian PM Eric Williams was 
denouncing Venezuelan attempts to ‘re-colonise the region’ 
through ‘petrodollar politics’.2 What is new, however, is the sheer 
extent of Caribbean reliance on Venezuelan financing and funding. 
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Petrocaribe 
 
The huge importance of Petrocaribe’s core oil-financing function is 
clear if we consider two crucial points. First, even after 
Petrocaribe’s introduction virtually all of its signatories have been 
spending far more foreign exchange on imports than they have 
received for exports, with the cumulative value of current-account 
deficits over the last decade running into the tens of billions. 
Second, in the absence of Petrocaribe, this situation would have 
been immeasurably worse. Oil prices doubled in the two years 
prior to Petrocaribe then skyrocketed to $140 (six times their 2003 
low) over the following three years. As Figure 1 (below) shows, 
Petrocaribe’s establishment in June 2005 arrested this upward 
trend, with the soft-loan portion absorbing 40 per cent of this 
sudden pressure on the public finances. When oil prices peaked in 
2008, Petrocaribe’s conditions were relaxed again (with up to 70 
per cent financing), providing an even softer cushion for this oil-
price shock. With oil prices stabilising around the $100 mark, 
Petrocaribe has continued to modulate volatility, with the upfront 
portion hovering at $40. In fact, over the lifetime of Petrocaribe the 
average upfront price has been $42, with $39 offered as a soft loan 
(of an average total price of $81). Excepting momentary dips in 
2005 and 2008, the normal price has not plumbed such depths 
since 2004.  
Figure 1 - Petrocaribe 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Estimated impact of Petrocaribe on effective price (USD) of oil imports for 
signatories, 2003-2012 (source: author’s elaboration based on data from 
OPEC.org).3 
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But per-barrel figures only hint at Petrocaribe’s real significance 
for Caribbean economies. In the absence of clear data on 
Petrocaribe-related debt levels – a point to which I will return – 
research has tended to overstate Caribbean indebtedness and its 
effects on PDVSA’s finances because they have wrongly assumed 
that signatories receive the permitted maximum. But by cross-
referencing our calculations of effective prices with data on real 
levels of supply, we can produce credible estimates of Petrocaribe’s 
impact in individual states.4 
 
Table 1: Estimated mean annual value (USD) of Petrocaribe 
financing relative to macroeconomic indicators, 2008-12 
 
 Dominica 
St Vincent & 
Grenadines 
Antigua-
Barbuda 
Quota (kbd)a 1 1 4.4 
Supply (kbd) 0.36 0.3 0.8 
Annual Value of 
PC Financing 
$6,073,074 $5,470,398 $14,076,416 
PC Financing/ 
GDP 
1.3% 0.8% 1.2% 
PC Financing / 
Total Revenue 
3.9% 2.9% 5.8% 
PC Financing / 
Per Capita 
$86 $50 $160 
 
Source: Quota and supply data from PDVSA Informes Financieros (pdvsa.com); GDP, 
revenue, and population data from IMF (imf.org). 
a thousands of barrels per day. 
 
As Table 1 reveals, the difference between quotas and real 
supply is massive, yet Petrocaribe’s impact remains hugely 
significant. Over the period 2008-2012, the average annual value of 
the financed portion ranged from $5.5 million to $14.1 million. This 
translates into 6 per cent of government revenue in Antigua, 4 per 
cent in Dominica, and 3 per cent in St Vincent. In the most extreme 
individual country year within this sample, Antigua and Barbuda’s 
2012 soft loan was worth nearly $31 million, approaching 13 per 
cent of revenue, $350 per inhabitant, or 2.6 per cent of GDP. The 
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most striking comparison, however, is with fiscal deficits. In 2011 
the net deficit for Dominica was $21.1 million, whereas for Antigua 
it was $32.6 million;5 even excluding Petrocaribe’s other benefits, it 
goes a long way towards keeping Caribbean economies on an even 
keel.  
Of course, soft loans are still loans, and they do need to be paid 
back, but Petrocaribe at least allows participating states to catch 
their breath, gather their thoughts, and attempt to come up with 
viable development strategies without the bank manager 
hammering on the door. And in reality Petrocaribe debt provides 
various side benefits to those contracting it. The conditions are so 
generous that debts actually lose as much as a quarter of their real 
value to inflation (assuming dollar inflation of 3 per cent) over 
their lifetime; funds set aside for future repayments can be used for 
social-development projects in the meantime; and there is a 
suggestion that Venezuela may have simply written off some long-
term Petrocaribe debts.6 Furthermore, the misleadingly named 
ALBA Caribe fund – actually a part of Petrocaribe – provides 
millions in grant funding, and via Petrocaribe Venezuela has also 
footed the bill for various oil-infrastructure upgrades that have 
provided investment and employment. Though only relevant in a 
disappointingly small number of cases (Guyana, Dominican 
Republic, and especially Nicaragua), Venezuela has also accepted 
repayment in kind, with debtor countries’ offering their surplus 
production at fair-trade prices. Overall, it is hard to disagree with 
David Jessop of the Caribbean Council, who noted in 2011 that: 
 
No one should be in any doubt about the critical importance of 
Venezuela's PetroCaribe programme. If it were not for the energy 
lifeline that it has provided to every Caribbean nation other than 
Trinidad and Barbados, much of the region would by now be in 
economic freefall.7 
 
The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) 
 
The impact of ALBA is narrower but often deeper. Clearly, 
Venezuela’s deepest involvement has been with co-founder Cuba, 
but this cooperation actually predates ALBA and is so wide-ranging 
as to be incomparable to the experience of other Caribbean ALBA 
members. Given the trend towards increased involvement of 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries (most recently St 
Lucia and Suriname), ALBA’s role in the Anglophone Caribbean is 
more relevant here. 
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On the whole, academic interest in this subject has been 
infrequent and superficial, yet Norman Girvan’s heroic solo efforts 
have provided enough clear evidence for us to reach certain 
conclusions.8 Based on official data, Girvan estimated in 2011 that 
development funding (including ALBA Caribe grant funding) had 
reached $44 million (USD) in Dominica, over $50 million in St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, and more than $65 million in Antigua 
and Barbuda.9 But having surveyed ALBA’s involvement in all three 
countries myself, I can confidently say that this is an 
understatement, since there are many more ALBA programmes 
than those listed in Girvan’s research.10 
But the advantage of ALBA funding is not purely financial. At 
points of acute crisis this support has come with a rapidity of 
approval and disbursement that only highlights the relative sloth 
and bureaucracy of traditional donor relationships. Not only that, 
ALBA funding has imposed only the lightest ‘social purpose’ 
conditionality, meaning that recipients have been able to direct it 
towards areas that they – rather than anonymous technocrats in 
Washington and Brussels – consider priorities. 
 
The Political Impact of Venezuelan Generosity 
 
Aside from the obvious boon to economic stability provided by 
Venezuelan support through ALBA and Petrocaribe, it has also had 
a political impact. In Anglophone ALBA countries there is little 
doubt that without Venezuelan support incumbent governments 
re-elected by slim margins (Antigua’s Baldwin Spencer and St 
Vincent’s Ralph Gonsalves) would have been defeated by now. The 
impact of Venezuela-led initiatives in these countries has even seen 
right-of-centre opposition parties reverse initial scepticism in the 
face of popular support (with the exception of Arnhim Eustace’s 
New Democrats in St Vincent). And right-of-centre governments 
elsewhere have been obliged at least to give the impression of 
using Petrocaribe funds to social expenditure; contravention of the 
vague ‘social purpose’ rule could jeopardise the huge financial 
benefits of annually renewed Petrocaribe deals. 
 
Bilateral and Regional Issues 
 
Beyond ALBA and Petrocaribe, there are many bilateral and 
regional issues in which Venezuela’s role is key. Despite much 
brouhaha, Venezuela’s Chávez-era stance on territorial disputes 
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with both Dominica (Bird Island) and Guyana (Essequibo) has been 
conciliatory. And though Petrocaribe may have ruffled feathers in 
oil-producing Trinidad and Tobago, the two governments have 
since settled their differences and reached agreement on an 
extremely rare joint-exploitation contract for the huge Loran-
Manatee gas field that traverses their maritime border. At a time 
when traditional partners like the US and the EU have lost interest 
in the Caribbean, Venezuela has also been more forceful than any 
other Latin American neighbour in underlining the region’s 
importance to new supranational institutions like the Community 
of Latin American and Caribbean States. If the Anglophone 
Caribbean is to make good on its commitment to strengthening 
relations with Latin America, the continued presence of a powerful 
and enthusiastic cheerleader with a foot in both camps is certainly 
desirable. 
 
THE DANGERS OF RECENT VENEZUELAN INSTABILITY FOR 
THE CARIBBEAN 
 
Given what we know about the impact on the Caribbean of 
Venezuela-led regional initiatives, the basic threat of instability is 
obvious. As Sir Ronald Sanders’ pointed out in a recent Jamaica 
Observer column, this threat is both economic and political.11 But 
while this is true, the ways in which it is true relate to peculiarities 
of Venezuelan political economy. 
 
Opposition Anti-Constitutional Measures: At the Root of ALBA and 
Petrocaribe 
 
Ironically, the current precariousness of Petrocaribe and ALBA 
stems back to early opposition attempts to destabilise the country 
and unseat Chávez by unconstitutional means, as it was the coup 
and PDVSA management strike in 2002-03 which led to the 
subsequent turn towards ‘21st Century Socialism’. Prior to these 
events, Chávez had only tinkered with the levers of the economy, 
favouring a ‘Third Way’ in the Tony Blair mould. But the 
intransigence of the opposition in refusing to accept his legitimacy 
despite various election victories convinced him that there could 
be no meaningful cooperation. Facing a recall referendum in 2004 
he found he had to consolidate his core support far more quickly 
than inefficient, factionalised, traditional institutions would ever 
have allowed. His solution was to use PDVSA – flush with foreign 
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exchange and free of obstructionist officials following the oil strike 
– to establish new parallel institutions that could deliver immediate 
benefits to his core constituency. The first were social programmes 
called ‘misiones’ (missions), the most famous of which brought 
Cuban doctors into poor areas of Venezuelan cities in exchange for 
subsidised oil. This exemplified the idea of complementarity which 
would become central to ALBA. Since the US had also backed 
opposition attempts to unseat him, Chávez also looked to reduce its 
leverage on Venezuela by diversifying exports away from the US 
market, which is the one element of self-interest within 
Petrocaribe’s dominant solidarity logic. 
 
The Precariousness of Parallel Governance 
 
From Chávez’s perspective another advantage of these new parallel 
institutions built around PDVSA was that they were under his 
quasi-direct control, with the unassuming energy minister Rafael 
Ramírez playing Robin to his Batman. The initial results achieved 
through these parallel structures were impressive in terms both 
political and social, with continued electoral success driven by 
marked improvements in health, literacy, and poverty indicators. 
This only encouraged Chávez to expand their functions and 
financing, with special funds being established to invest portions of 
PDVSA foreign-exchange at home and abroad according to 
presidential discretion (most notably, BANDES and FONDEN). This 
matters to the Caribbean because Petrocaribe is governed and 
funded through PDVSA, and its ALBA Caribe grants often come 
from these latter discretionary funds. Regionalised ALBA social 
‘missions’ are likewise executed and paid for by PDVSA, whereas 
large loans and grants associated with ALBA – as in the case of the 
ALBA Bank – tend in reality to come from funds at presidential 
discretion.  
The problem is that over time these parallel structures have 
succumbed to the same vices that undermine the effectiveness of 
the traditional state in Venezuela: corruption, waste, inefficiency, 
improvisation, and short-termism, to name but a few. Worse, 
because of their youth and dubious legitimacy, they have been very 
sloppy in terms of transparency and accountability. Planning and 
execution have often been deficient, and because of centralisation 
in the executive, logjams frequently occur when the president’s 
attention is diverted elsewhere. Greater transparency might help as 
a form of self-regulation, but the uncertain status of these 
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institutions means that the government is reluctant to facilitate 
public scrutiny. 
 
The Compounding Effect of an Uncompromising Opposition 
 
This government cautiousness, bordering on paranoia, is 
exacerbated by the knowledge that any slip will be pounced upon 
by an opposition that seeks Chávez’s removal with an intensity 
bordering on the manic. By relentlessly fashioning weapons out of 
whatever symbolic or informational debris it finds lying around, 
this seething opposition renders the government even less likely to 
expose any weak points to potential attack. And so, even during the 
calms between the storms, governance problems simply persist. 
During the storms, such as recent protests, these problems are 
aggravated, which is politically beneficial to the opposition.  
Because so many of the state’s normal functions are run and 
funded via improvised parallel institutions, they are more 
susceptible to failure if human and financial resources are diverted 
elsewhere, as occurs when the state becomes absorbed in fighting 
the literal and metaphorical fires set by the opposition. Since the 
availability and efficacy of public services is a serious issue for all 
Venezuelans, this indirect effect of opposition-led instability has 
the potential to reduce support for the government for reasons 
quite distinct from those foregrounded by protesters. This is 
compounded by an inevitable ‘politics fatigue’ given the enduring 
ferocity of Venezuelan political contestation. Because the state is 
seen as having ultimate control over society, it is the most obvious 
target for those simply wanting any kind of change in order to 
escape the unrelenting tension of recent years. 
 
Why Might the Caribbean Worry? 
 
The problem for the Caribbean is that the Venezuelan opposition 
shares none of the current government’s concern for the past, 
present, or future of the region. One of the refrains of opposition 
rhetoric throughout the Chávez/Maduro era has been that the 
government is ‘giving away the oil’ abroad rather than providing 
for its own impoverished citizens, and this is an argument that 
achieves some traction. Both ALBA and Petrocaribe are officially 
classed by the opposition coalition as ‘gifts’ that need to be reined 
in.12 
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Economically speaking, meanwhile, the many serious drains on 
Venezuelan state resources have provoked serious cash-flow 
problems, an issue that can be deliberately exacerbated by 
supporters of the opposition in particular. The most obvious 
problem is currency arbitrage, whereby dollars bought cheaply 
from the government for fake import transactions are recycled at 
great profit via the currency black market. Since the value 
extracted by this practice is proportional to the capital invested in 
it, those with the requisite money and wherewithal can and do gain 
the most. While Petrocaribe and ALBA did not create this problem, 
they could be affected by it, because one way of plugging any gaps 
would be to reduce expenditure and non-receipt of foreign 
exchange via these mechanisms. 
If these initiatives were more fully institutionalised, then this 
might not be such an immediate threat, as any disengagement 
would have to be gradual, as when one particular party opts to 
withdraw from a binding trade agreement. But because they are 
ad-hoc and couched in the parallel institutions built around PDVSA, 
whose governance centres on the presidency, any change in 
government could see these schemes quickly dismantled. Bilateral 
Petrocaribe supply contracts, which are renewable annually, could 
only ever have a maximum of one year remaining before expiry. 
Most ALBA initiatives are even less binding than that. 
 
Why Needn’t the Caribbean Worry? 
 
If there are indeed serious threats to the continuation of 
Venezuela-led schemes upon which the rest of the Caribbean relies, 
and if destabilising opposition protests only reinforce these 
threats, shouldn’t Caribbean states be quaking in their boots? The 
answer is mixed. 
Although the underlying problems are serious and need to be 
addressed, the significance of the current cycle of protests can very 
easily be misjudged, particularly if one makes the mistake of 
believing the hype. The foreign media often seem determined to 
portray the opposition’s claims as gospel and their protesters as 
representatives of a majoritarian nationwide movement, but their 
thinking is just as wishful today as it has been for more than a 
decade. Though hard to believe given what we see in our media, 
according to Venezuela’s only balanced media outlet ‘at their height 
the protests involved 18 of [the country’s] 335 municipalities’.13 
While some are of course more populous than others, even in the 
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municipalities affected participation is concentrated within the 
opposition’s usual constituency at the higher end of the social scale. 
The most recent elections were in December and the margin of 
victory for Maduro’s PSUV party grew rather than declining. 
Paradoxically, though violent protests give the impression of 
imminent collapse, they are in fact a symptom of the opposition’s 
failure to understand or assimilate the new reality of a more 
inclusive Venezuela. This more than anything else has prevented it 
from mounting a successful electoral challenge to the PSUV’s 
dominance. The only opposition figure to have come close 
(Henrique Capriles) did so by at least feigning centrism, but recent 
protests have seen him sidelined in favour of more radical leaders. 
Thus, though Venezuela’s problems are real, the threat they 
represent for the Caribbean may not be as imminent as one might 
think. It will be another two years before the opposition has the 
right to launch a recall referendum, and there is little doubt that 
they will do so. This will bring a whole new round of breast-beating 
and head-scratching about Venezuela, but unless the opposition 
can get to grips with the post-Chávez political landscape, it’s quite 
possible that the government’s remarkable longevity will be 
extended once again. 
 
THE CARIBBEAN RESPONSE 
 
So what can and should Caribbean policymakers do about it? 
CARICOM’s response thus far has been to support the 
constitutional order, thereby rejecting a destabilisation strategy 
that ignores Maduro’s twice-tested democratic legitimacy. Given 
the potential for long-term instability in Venezuela if respect for 
representative democracy were to break down entirely, this is 
surely the correct approach in the short term. Long-term, if 
Caribbean states genuinely want to bolster the sustainability of the 
Venezuela-led schemes from which they gain, it is Petrocaribe and 
ALBA’s underlying deficiencies that must be tackled. 
First, given the political sensitivity of ‘giving away the oil’ in 
Venezuela’s domestic politics, Caribbean participants in ALBA and 
Petrocaribe should be doing their utmost to correct what Norman 
Girvan has called the ‘asymmetrical solidarity’ of these schemes, 
whereby Venezuela does the giving and everyone else the taking.14 
Special and differential treatment is one thing, but one-way traffic 
is another thing entirely. To the extent that Caribbean states’ grants 
and soft-loans deprive Venezuela of much-needed foreign 
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exchange, these states are complicit in causing the political 
problems that may eventually see their benefactors ejected from 
office. This would be a myopic approach, and certainly far worse 
than the best possible outcome for the Caribbean states involved. 
Serious consideration must be given to how the Caribbean can help 
to replace complicity with complementarity.  
Second, though it may again seem difficult in the short term, 
Caribbean states should reject the shadowy governance that has 
characterised Petrocaribe and ALBA to date. As noted above, a lack 
of formal constraints is warmly embraced in a region more 
accustomed to having to write reports about the reports about the 
reports wherever foreign aid is concerned, but this too is 
shortsighted. One major failing of Venezuela-led initiatives is their 
opacity. The absence of clear data on the extent and nature of 
overseas finance and funding creates an informational vacuum that 
can be filled with even the wildest accusations. Again, this 
promotes a vague but significant unease vis-à-vis the Venezuelan 
state both domestically and internationally. Small though many 
Caribbean states may be, they could push for greater transparency 
in their dealings with Venezuela, particularly if regional forums 
such as the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and CARICOM 
were to fix positions jointly. 
Third, the Anglophone Caribbean in particular needs to promote 
closer, institutionalised relations with the non-Venezuelan Latin 
American states of Petrocaribe and ALBA if they wish to see these 
organisations outlast the PSUV government in Venezuela. Though 
Venezuela’s dominance in ALBA is sometimes overplayed, it is 
nonetheless the undoubted lynchpin of both schemes. Were a 
hypothetical opposition government to remove this lynchpin, it is 
hard to see how they could remain standing. Caribbean states 
calling for clearer institutionalisation of ALBA, for example, would 
find support in Bolivia and Ecuador, both of which have long 
favoured this approach. In Petrocaribe’s case, even the simple 
extension of renewal periods to three years would bring greater 
stability, whereas publication of bilateral deals could allay the fears 
of electorates whose media are quick to suggest that Caribbean 
leaders have somehow signed away their souls. Meanwhile, real 
efforts must be made to develop relations between Latin American 
and Anglophone participants – Ecuador and Dominica in ALBA, say, 
or Nicaragua and Guyana in Petrocaribe – the ultimate goal being 
to decentralise both schemes away from Venezuela. If barter trade 
can function for Venezuela when importing from Nicaragua, 
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Guyana, and the Dominican Republic, why not in other Petrocaribe 
trade relations where Venezuela is not involved? If Venezuelan 
military aircraft can carry Cuban doctors to perform free eye 
surgeries in the Eastern Caribbean, why could LIAT not do the 
same? 
But the specifics matter less than the principle: if Caribbean 
economies depend heavily on ALBA and Petrocaribe, which are in 
turn over-dependent on politically vulnerable governance 
structures in Venezuela, then something must be done to mitigate 
dependence and vulnerability at all points in the chain. The threat 
to Caribbean political economy may not be as imminent as it would 
first appear, but difficult dilemmas should still be faced sooner 
rather than later. 
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